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Nash Equilibrium Seeking for Games in Second-order Systems without
Velocity Measurement
Maojiao Ye, Jizhao Yin and Le Yin
Abstract—The design of Nash equilibrium seeking strategies
for games in which the involved players are of second-order
integrator-type dynamics is investigated in this paper. Noticing
that velocity signals are usually noisy or not available for
feedback control in practical engineering systems, this paper
supposes that the velocity signals are not accessible for the
players. To deal with the absence of velocity measurements,
two estimators are designed, based on which Nash equilibrium
seeking strategies are constructed. The first strategy is estab-
lished by employing an observer, which has the same order as
the players’ dynamics, to estimate the unavailable system states
(e.g., the players’ velocities). The second strategy is designed
based on a high-pass filter and is motivated by the incentive
to reduce the order of the closed-loop system which in turn
reduces the computation costs of the seeking algorithm. Ex-
tensions to Nash equilibrium seeking for networked games are
provided. Taking the advantages of leader-following consensus
protocols, it turns out that both the observer-based method
and the filter-based method can be adapted to deal with games
in distributed systems, which shows the extensibility of the
developed strategies. Through Lyapunov stability analysis, it is
analytically proven that the players’ actions can be regulated to
the Nash equilibrium point and their velocities can be regulated
to zero by utilizing the proposed velocity-free Nash equilibrium
seeking strategies. A numerical example is provided for the
verifications of the proposed algorithms.
Index Terms—Nash equilibrium seeking; second-order game;
without velocity measurement.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of Nash equilibrium seek-
ing algorithms in the past few years, games with second-
order integrator-type players have drawn some attention
recently. In [1][2], both centralized and distributed Nash
equilibrium seeking methods were developed for games
with second-order integrator-type dynamics. In particular,
a seeking strategy with bounded controls was constructed
for the considered game as in practical engineering systems,
actuators usually have limited capabilities. In [3], the authors
considered a game in single-input single output dynamical
systems with relative degree two. Based on a second-order
dynamics with damping coefficients, a control input was
designed for the game to achieve centralized Nash equilib-
rium seeking. It was proven that by utilizing the designed
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control input with full state feedback, the Nash equilibrium
can be stabilized. In [4], we considered games in which the
players’ dynamics appear to be heterogeneous in the sense
that some players are of first-order integrator-type dynamics
while the rest are second-order integrators. Based on action
and velocity feedbacks, Nash equilibrium seeking strategies
were proposed for both full information games and partial
information games. In [5], games with multiple integrator-
type dynamics were concerned and a Nash equilibrium
seeking strategy was proposed by employing adaptive control
gains. In [6], Nash equilibrium seeking for second-order
integrator-type games was addressed by designing methods
based on projection operators, consensus protocols as well
as primal-dual techniques. However, it is worth mentioning
that the above works achieve Nash equilibrium seeking
by utilizing full state feedback, i.e., both the players’
position information and velocity information should be
measured to implement the aforementioned methods,
which restricts their applications to some extent as
practical situations show that it might be challenging
or costly to measure the accurate velocities in real time.
It is inadvisable to utilize velocity information as in
many practical situations, velocity measurements are usu-
ally noisy, which may deteriorate the control performance.
Moreover, it is costly and complex to install extra velocity
sensors in some engineering systems. Actually, quite a few
works have been reported to deal with the unavailability
of velocity measurements for various control applications.
For example, only actuator position measurement units but
not velocity measurement devices are included in many
commercial robotic systems (e.g., PUMA 560 robot) [7].
To compensate for the limited sensors installed in rigid-link
flexible-joint robots, the authors employed a set of filters
in the control strategy design to achieve position tracking
of the robots [7]. With the development of robots, motion
control of mechanical systems without velocity measurement
has drawn increasing attention [8]. Moreover, as angular
velocity and relative angular velocities are absent, attitude
consensus among a group of spacecraft was addressed by
introducing some auxiliary dynamics in [9]. Motivated by
the fact that ship velocity measurements are usually unavail-
able, the authors in [10] designed a controller to drive an
underactuated ship along a prescribed path without utilizing
ship velocities. Furthermore, as it is challenging to obtain
velocity signals for electro-hydraulic servomechanisms, an
adaptive strategy was proposed for the tracking control of
electro-hydraulic servomechanisms based on extended-state-
observers and backstepping techniques in [11]. With the lack
of velocity feedback, collaborative control (e.g., consensus,
formation, to mention just a few) of second-order multi-
agent systems by utilizing only position information was also
reported in quite a few works [12]-[14].
In spirit of relaxing the requirements on velocity mea-
surements, this paper considers Nash equilibrium seeking for
games in which the players are of second-order integrator-
type dynamics without utilizing velocity measurements. In
comparison with the existing works, the main contributions
of the paper are summarized as follows.
1) Nash equilibrium seeking for games with second-order
integrator-type players is investigated. Compared with
the existing works in [1]-[6], the velocity measure-
ments are not utilized in the control design, which
benefits the applications of games to circumstances in
which the players are not equipped with any velocity
measurement devices or the measured velocities are
noisy. An observer-based approach and a filter-based
approach are proposed to achieve Nash equilibrium
seeking based on the estimations of velocities.
2) Stability of the Nash equilibrium under the proposed
seeking strategies is analytically investigated. It is
shown through Lyapunov stability analysis that the
players’ actions can be regulated to the Nash equi-
librium and their velocities can be steered to zero by
utilizing the proposed methods.
3) Extensions to partial information games under dis-
tributed networks are discussed. By further introducing
consensus protocols into the proposed algorithms, we
show that both the observer-based approach and the
filter-based approach can be adapted to distributed
games thus verifying their extensibility. Compared
with [15]-[16], the proposed methods accommodate
the players’ dynamics without utilizing velocity mea-
surement while in [15]-[16], the seeking algorithms
were designed for games with first-order integrator-
type players.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The problem
is formulated in Section II and the main results are given in
Section III, in which an observer-based Nash equilibrium
seeking strategy and a filter-based approach are proposed
for the considered game. In Section IV, extensions of the
proposed methods to games under distributed networks are
provided and in Section V, numerical simulations illustrate
the effectiveness of the developed algorithms. In the last,
Section VI provides concluding remarks for the paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Problem 1: Consider a game with N players in which
player i’s action is governed by
x˙i =vi,
v˙i =ui,
(1)
for i ∈ N, where xi ∈ R, vi ∈ R and ui ∈ R denote the
action, velocity and control input of player i, respectively.
Moreover, N = {1, 2, · · · , N} is the set of players involved
in the game. Associate player i with a cost function fi(x),
where i ∈ N and x = [x1, x2, · · · , xN ]T . The objective of
this paper is to design Nash equilibrium seeking strategies
for the considered game provided that the players’ velocity
measurements are not available.
For notational clarity, let x−i =
[x1, x2, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xN ]T . Then, the Nash
equilibrium x∗ = (x∗i ,x
∗
−i) is defined as an action
profile on which
fi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≤ fi(xi,x∗−i), (2)
for xi ∈ R, i ∈ N. In addition, we say that Nash equilibrium
seeking for the considered game is achieved if
lim
t→∞
||x(t) − x∗|| = 0,
lim
t→∞
||v(t)|| = 0, (3)
where v = [v1, v2, · · · , vN ]T . Furthermore, if the seeking
strategy enables (3) to be satisfied by utilizing only the
players’ local information, we say that distributed Nash
equilibrium seeking is achieved.
Remark 1: Different from [1]-[6] that utilized full state
(including both positions and velocities) feedback in the con-
trol law, this paper supposes that the velocity measurements
are not available. Note that the concerned problem is of vital
importance as practical experiences have shown that velocity
measurements tend to contain noises which are difficult to be
filtered away. Furthermore, many engineering devices (e.g.,
robots, ships) are not equipped with velocity measurement
units and it might be costly to install additional velocity
measurement sensors.
For notational convenience, let P(x) =[
∂f1(x)
∂x1
, ∂f2(x)
∂x2
, · · · , ∂fN (x)
∂xN
]T
and
H(x) =


∂2f1(x)
∂x2
1
∂2f1(x)
∂x1∂x2
· · · ∂2f1(x)
∂x1∂xN
∂2f2(x)
∂x2∂x1
∂2fn+2(x)
∂x2
2
· · · ∂2f2(x)
∂x2∂xN
...
. . .
...
∂2fN (x)
∂xN∂x1
∂2fN (x)
∂xN∂x2
· · · ∂2fN (x)
∂x2
N

 .
The following provided assumptions will be utilized to
develop the main results.
Assumption 1: For each i ∈ N, fi(x) is twice-
continuously differentiable.
Assumption 2: There exists a positive constant m such
that
(x− y)T (P(x)− P(y)) ≥ m||x− y||2, (4)
for x,y ∈ RN .
Assumption 3: There exists a positive constant h such that
‖H(x)‖ is upper bounded by h, i.e., sup
x∈RN‖H(x)‖= h.
Remark 2: Assumptions 1-3 are quite mild for games
with second-order integrator-type players in the sense that
Assumption 3 can be easily removed by degrading the
corresponding results to local/semi-global versions. Note that
by Assumption 3, we get that for each i ∈ N, ∂fi(x)
∂xi
is
globally Lipschitz for x ∈ RN . For notational clarity, we
denote the Lipschitz constant of
∂fi(x)
∂xi
as li. Moreover,
Assumption 2 serves as a commonly utilized condition that
results in unique Nash equilibrium on which P(x∗) = 0N ,
where 0N is an N -dimensional zero column vector [15].
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, an observer-based seeking strategy and a
filter-based seeking strategy will be successively established
to achieve of the goal of the paper.
A. An observer-based Nash equilibrium seeking strategy
As the players’ velocities can not be accessed for feedback
in the seeking strategy, it is intuitive that we can design
observers to estimate them. Based on this idea, we design
the control input of player i for i ∈ N as
ui = −k1 ∂fi(x)
∂xi
− k1v¯i, (5)
where v¯i represents player i’s estimate on its own velocity
vi and k1 is a positive constant to be further determined.
Moreover, we design the velocity observer as
˙¯xi =− k2(x¯i − xi) + v¯i,
˙¯vi =− k3(x¯i − xi) + ui,
(6)
where x¯i is an auxiliary variable and k2, k3 are positive
control gains.
In the following, we establish the stability of Nash equi-
librium under the proposed method in (5)-(6).
Theorem 1: Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 are satisfied
and
k1 >
ǫ2(2ǫ1h+ h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+ 1)
ǫ1(2ǫ2 − 1) , (7)
where ǫ1 and ǫ2 are arbitrary positive constants that satisfy
ǫ1 <
2m
h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+1 , ǫ2 >
1
2 . Then, the Nash equilibrium
seeking is achieved by (5)-(6).
Proof: Define the observation error as
x˜i = x¯i − xi, v˜i = v¯i − vi. (8)
Hence,
˙˜xi = ˙¯xi − x˙i
=− k2(x¯i − xi) + v¯i − vi
=− k2x˜i + v˜i,
(9)
and
˙˜vi = ˙¯vi − v˙i
=− k3(x¯i − xi) = −k3x˜i.
(10)
For notational convenience, let ξi = [x˜i, v˜i]
T and define
the Lyapunov candidate function as
V1 =
N∑
i=1
ξTi Pξi, (11)
where P is a symmetric positive definite matrix such that
P
[ −k2 1
−k3 0
]
+
[ −k2 1
−k3 0
]T
P = −Q, (12)
and Q is a symmetric positive definite matrix. Note that
the existence of P,Q can be concluded by noticing that[ −k2 1
−k3 0
]
is Hurwitz. Then, it can be easily obtained that
V˙1 = −
N∑
i=1
λmin(Q)||ξi||2, (13)
from which it is clear that
lim
t→∞
||ξ(t)|| = 0, (14)
where ξ = [ξT1 , ξ
T
2 , · · · , ξTN ]T .
To further proceed the convergence analysis, define
V2 =
1
2
(v + P(x))T (v + P(x))
+
1
2
(x− x∗)T (x− x∗).
(15)
Let v¯ = [v¯1, v¯2, · · · , v¯N ]T and v˜ = [v˜1, v˜2, · · · , v˜N ]T .
Then, the time derivative of V2 along the given trajectory is
V˙2 =(v + P(x))T (−k1P(x)− k1v¯ +H(x)v)
+ (x− x∗)Tv
≤− k1||v + P(x)||2 −m||x− x∗||2
− k1(v + P(x))T v˜ + (v + P(x))TH(x)v
+ (x− x∗)T (v + P(x))
≤− (k1 − h)||v + P(x)||2 −m||x− x∗||2
+ k1||v + P(x)||||v˜||
+ (h
√
N max
i∈N
{li}+ 1)||v + P(x)||||x − x∗||,
(16)
by utilizing Assumptions 1-3.
Noticing that
||v + P(x)||||x− x∗||
≤||v + P(x)||
2
2ǫ1
+
ǫ1||x− x∗||2
2
,
(17)
and
k1||v + P(x)||||v˜||
≤k1||v + P(x)||
2
2ǫ2
+
k1ǫ2||v˜||2
2
,
(18)
where ǫ1, ǫ2 are positive constants that can be arbitrarily
chosen, we can get that
V˙2 ≤−
(
k1 − h− h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+ 1
2ǫ1
− k1
2ǫ2
)
||v + P(x)||2
−
(
m− (h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+ 1)ǫ1
2
)
||x− x∗||2
+
k1ǫ2
2
||v˜||2.
(19)
Let ǫ1 <
2m
h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+1 and ǫ2 >
1
2 . Then, for fixed
ǫ1, ǫ2, choose k1 >
ǫ2(2ǫ1h+h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+1)
ǫ1(2ǫ2−1) , by which
ρ1 = k1 − h − h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+1
2ǫ1
− k12ǫ2 > 0 and ρ2 =
m− (h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+1)ǫ1
2 > 0. Hence,
V˙2 ≤ −min{ρ1, ρ2}||E||2 +
k1ǫ2
2
||v˜||2, (20)
where E = [(v + P(x))T , (x− x∗)T ]T .
Therefore,
V˙2 ≤ −min{ρ1, ρ2}
2
||E||2, (21)
for ||E|| >
√
k1ǫ2
min{ρ1,ρ2} ||v˜||.
Hence, by Theorem 4.19 in [24], we get that
||E(t)|| ≤ β(||E(0)||, t) +
√
k1ǫ2
min{ρ1, ρ2}
||v˜||, (22)
where β(·) ∈ KL.
Recalling that
lim
t→∞
||ξ(t)|| = 0, (23)
we get that
lim
t→∞
||E(t)|| = 0, (24)
indicating that
lim
t→∞
||x(t) − x∗|| = 0, (25)
and
lim
t→∞ ||v(t) + P(x)|| = 0. (26)
Furthermore, by limt→∞ ||x(t) − x∗|| = 0, we get that
||P(x)|| → 0 as t → ∞, which further indicates that
limt→∞ ||v(t)|| = 0. Hence, we arrive at the conclusion.
In this section, the seeking strategy is designed by con-
structing a state observer given in (6). It should be noted that
the observer is of the same order as the players’ dynamics in
(1). An intuitive question is whether it is possible to design
reduced-order strategies, which would relax the computation
costs, to achieve Nash equilibrium seeking or not. In the
following section, we provide another strategy design to
answer this question.
B. A filter-based Nash equilibrium seeking strategy
To further reduce the order of the Nash equilibrium
seeking strategy, we design the control input of player i for
i ∈ N as
ui = −k1 ∂fi(x)
∂xi
− k1yi, (27)
where k1 is a positive constant and
yi = −xˆi + k2xi, (28)
and xˆi is an auxiliary variable generated by
˙ˆxi = −k2xˆi + k22xi, (29)
where k2 is a positive constant to be further determined.
Remark 3: In the control input design (27), the gradient
term is included for the optimization of the players’ objective
functions. Moreover, yi serves as an estimate of the velocity
of player i and is included to stabilize the system. To provide
more insights on how yi is generated, we can conduct
Laplace transformation for (28)-(29). By (28), we get that
Yi(s) = −Xˆi(s) + k2Xi(s), (30)
and by (29), we get that
sXˆi(s)− xˆi(0) = −k2Xˆi(s) + k22Xi(s), (31)
where s is the complex frequency variable and Xˆi(s), Xi(s),
Yi(s) are the signals associated with xˆi(t), xi(t), yi(t) in the
complex frequency domain, respectively. By (30)-(31), it can
be easily calculated that
Yi(s) =
sk2
s+ k2
Xi(s)− 1
s+ k2
xˆi(0), (32)
where s
s+k2
is a high-pass filter with cut-off frequency k2.
This explains the generation of yi(t) and why we term the
method in (28)-(29) as a filter-based seeking strategy.
The following theorem establishes the stability of the Nash
equilibrium under the proposed method in (27)-(29).
Theorem 2: Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 are satisfied
and
k1 > h+
ǫ(h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+ 1)
2
, k2 > k1, (33)
where ǫ is an arbitrary positive constant that satisfies ǫ >
h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+1
2m . Then, the Nash equilibrium seeking is
achieved by (27)-(29).
Proof: From (27)-(29), we can obtain that the concate-
nated vector form of the closed-loop system can be written
as
x˙ =v,
v˙ =− k1P(x)− k1y
y˙ =− k2y + k2v,
(34)
where y = [y1, y2, · · · , yN ]T .
Define y¯ = y − v. Then, it can be obtained that
x˙ =v,
v˙ =− k1P(x)− k1v − k1y¯
˙¯y =− k2y¯ − (−k1P(x)− k1v − k1y¯).
(35)
To establish the stability property for (35), one can define
the Lyapunov candidate function as
V =
1
2
(v + P(x))T (v + P(x))
+
1
2
(x− x∗)T (x− x∗) + 1
2
y¯T y¯.
(36)
Then, the time derivative of V along the trajectory of (35)
is
V˙ =(x− x∗)T (v + P(x)− P(x))
+ (v + P(x))T (−k1P(x)− k1v +H(x)v)
− (v + P(x))T k1y¯ + y¯T (−k2y¯ − v˙)
=(x− x∗)T (v + P(x))− (x− x∗)TP(x)
− k1(v + P(x))T (v + P(x)) + (v + P(x))TH(x)v
− (v + P(x))T k1y¯ + y¯T (−k2y¯ − v˙)
≤−m||x− x∗||2 − k1||v + P(x)||2 − (k2 − k1)||y¯||2
+ ||x− x∗||||v + P(x)|| + (v + P(x))TH(x)v
≤−m||x− x∗||2 − k1||v + P(x)||2
− (k2 − k1)||y¯||2 + h||v + P(x)||2
+ (h
√
N max
i∈N
{li}+ 1)||v + P(x)||||x − x∗||,
(37)
based on Assumptions 1-3.
Noticing that
(h
√
N max
i∈N
{li}+ 1)||v + P(x)||||x− x∗||
≤h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+ 1
2ǫ
||x− x∗||2
+
ǫ(h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+ 1)
2
||v + P(x)||2,
(38)
where ǫ is a positive constant that can be arbitrarily chosen.
Hence,
V˙ ≤−
(
m− h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+ 1
2ǫ
)
||x− x∗||2
−
(
k1 − h− ǫ(h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+ 1)
2
)
||v + P(x)||2
− (k2 − k1)||y¯||2.
(39)
Let ǫ > h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+1
2m and then for fixed ǫ, choose
k1 > h +
ǫ(h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+1)
2 . Then, for fixed k1, choose
k2 > k1. By the above tuning rule, we get that,
V˙ ≤ −ρ||E||2, (40)
whereE = [(v+P(x))T , (x−x∗)T , y¯T ]T and ρ = min{m−
h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+1
2ǫ , k1 − h− ǫ(h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+1)
2 , k2 − k1}.
Hence,
||E(t)|| ≤ e−ρt||E(0)||, (41)
by which we can obtain the conclusion.
Remark 4: From the proof of Theorem 2, it can be seen
that yi in (27)-(29) can be regarded as the estimated value
of vi. Therefore, (29) is designed to drive yi to vi, which
is hard to be accurately measured in practice. By (36) and
(41), we get that ||E(t)|| → 0 as t → ∞. As x(t) → x∗
for t → ∞, we obtain that ||P(x)|| → 0 as t → ∞ by
Assumption 2. Hence, ||v(t)|| → 0 as t→∞, which further
indicates that ||y(t)|| → 0 as t→∞.
Remark 5: Compared with the observer-based approach in
(5)-(6), we can see that the filter-based approach in (27)-(29)
is of less order. However, it should be mentioned that there
are two parameters to be tuned for the filter-based algorithm
(see the statement of Theorem 2) while the observer-based
approach only requires the tuning of one parameter (see the
statement in Theorem 1).
IV. EXTENSIONS TO GAMES UNDER DISTRIBUTED
COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
As the players’ objective functions and the gradient values
utilized the strategy design depend on all the players’ actions,
it is necessary to study distributed Nash equilibrium seeking
for networked games provided that the players have limited
access into the other ones’ actions. Hence, in this section,
we further consider distributed Nash equilibrium seeking by
supposing that player i could not directly get xj if player j
is not its neighbor. Under this setting,
∂fi(x)
∂xi
is not available
for feedback in the control input design as x is not available
for player i. To deal with this situation, we suppose that
the players are engaged in a communication network G,
defined as a pair (N, E), where N is the node set and
E ⊆ N × N is the edge set. For an undirected graph, an
edge (i, j) ∈ E if nodes i and j can receive information
from each other. The undirected graph is connected if for
any pair of vertices, there exists a path. The adjacency
matrix of undirected communication G is A = [aij ], where
aij = 1 if (j, i) ∈ E , aij = 0 if (j, i) /∈ E and
aii = 0. Moreover, the Laplacian matrix of G is L =
D − A, where D is a diagonal matrix with its ith diagonal
entry being dii =
∑N
j=1 aij . In the following, we consider
distributed Nash equilibrium seeking strategy design under
undirected and connected communication graphs. For nota-
tional clarity, define A0 as a diagonal matrix whose diagonal
entries are a11, a12, · · · , a1N , a21, · · · , aNN , successively.
Moreover, let IN×N and ⊗ be an N×N dimensional identity
matrix and the Kronecker product, respectively. Moreover,
for a symmetric real matrix Γ, λmin(Γ) defines the minimum
eigenvalue of Γ. In the following, the observer-based method
and the filter-based method will be successively adapted for
distributed games.
A. An observer-based approach for distributed Nash equi-
librium seeking
Based on the velocity observer design in (5)-(6) and
the distributed seeking strategy in [15]-[18], the distributed
control input of player i can be designed as
ui = −k1 ∂fi
∂xi
(zi)− k1v¯i, (42)
where v¯i represents player i’s estimate on its own velocity
vi,
∂fi
∂xi
(zi) =
∂fi(x)
∂xi
|
x=zi
and zi is a vector representing
player i’ estimate on x. Moreover, x¯i, v¯i and zi are variables
generated by
˙¯xi =− k2(x¯i − xi) + v¯i,
˙¯vi =− k3(x¯i − xi) + ui,
z˙ij =− k4(
N∑
k=1
aik(zij − zkj) + aij(zij − xj)),
(43)
where k4 is a positive constant, zi = [zi1, zi2, · · · , ziN ]T and
x¯i, k2, k3 follows the definitions in Section III-A.
Remark 6: It is worth mentioning that in (42)-(43), each
player updates its action by utilizing only its local infor-
mation (e.g., its own information and information from its
neighbors). Compared with the strategy in (5)-(6), it is
clear that the strategy in (42)-(43) serves as the distributed
counterpart of (5)-(6).
Define
x˜i = x¯i − xi, v˜i = v¯i − vi. (44)
Then, treating v˜, defined as v˜ = [v˜1, v˜2, · · · , v˜N ]T , as an
input for the following subsystem
x˙i =vi,
v˙i =− k1 ∂fi
∂xi
(zi)− k1v˜i − k1vi,
z˙ij =− k4(
N∑
k=1
aik(zij − zkj) + aij(zij − xj)), i ∈ N
(45)
it can be shown that (45) is input-to-state stable by tuning
the control gains as illustrated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 are satisfied.
Then, (45) is input-to-state stable by choosing
k1 >
2ǫ3
2ǫ3 − 1
(
h+
(h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+ 1)
2ǫ1
+
maxi∈N{li}+
√
N
2
)
k4 >
√
N
2λmin(L ⊗ IN×N +A0) +
N maxi∈N{li}
2ǫ2λmin(L ⊗ IN×N +A0)
+
k21 maxi∈N{li}
2λmin(L ⊗ IN×N +A0) ,
(46)
where ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3 that are positive constants that satisfy
(h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+1)ǫ1
2 +
N maxi∈N{li}ǫ2
2 < m, and ǫ3 >
1
2 .
Proof: Define the Lyapunov candidate function as
V =
1
2
(v + P(x))T (v + P(x))
+
1
2
(x− x∗)T (x− x∗)
+
1
2
(z− 1N ⊗ x)T (z− 1N ⊗ x),
(47)
where z = [zT1 , z
T
2 , · · · , zTN ]T , and P(z) =[
∂f1
∂x1
(z1),
∂f2
∂x2
(z2), · · · , ∂fN∂xN (zN )
]T
.
Then, the time derivative of V along the trajectory of (45)
is
V =(v + P(x))T (−k1P(x)− k1v¯ +H(x)v)
+ (x− x∗)Tv − (z− 1N ⊗ x)T×
(k4(L ⊗ IN×N +A0)(z− 1N ⊗ x) + 1N ⊗ v)
+ k1(v + P(x))T (P(x)− P(z))
≤ − k1||v + P(x)||2 −m||x− x∗||2
− k1(v + P(x))T v˜ + (v + P(x))TH(x)v
+ (x− x∗)T (v + P(x))
− k4λmin(L ⊗ IN×N +A0)||z− 1N ⊗ x||2
− (z− 1N ⊗ x)T1N ⊗ v
+ k1(v + P(x))T (P(x)− P(z))
≤ − (k1 − h)||v + P(x)||2 −m||x− x∗||2
+ k1||v + P(x)||||v˜||
+ (h
√
N max
i∈N
{li}+ 1)||v + P(x)||||x − x∗||
− k4λmin(L ⊗ IN×N +A0)||z− 1N ⊗ x||2
+
√
N ||z− 1N ⊗ x||||P(x) + v||
+N max
i∈N
{li}||z− 1N ⊗ x||||x − x∗||
+ k1 max
i∈N
{li}||v + P(x)||||z − 1N ⊗ x||,
(48)
where λmin(L ⊗ IN×N + A0) > 0 as the communication
graph G is undirected and connected.
Therefore,
V˙2 ≤− ρ1||v + P(x)||2 − ρ2||x− x∗||2
− ρ3||z− 1N ⊗ x||2 +
k1ǫ3
2
||v˜||2,
(49)
where ρ1 = k1−h− (h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+1)
2ǫ1
−
√
N
2 −maxi∈N{li}2 −
k1
2ǫ3
, ρ2 = m− (h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+1)ǫ1
2 − N maxi∈N{li}ǫ22 , ρ3 =
k4λmin(L⊗IN×N+A0)−
√
N
2 −N maxi∈N{li}2ǫ2 −
k21 maxi∈N{li}
2
and ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3 are positive constants that can be arbitrarily
chosen. Choose ǫ1, ǫ2 to be sufficiently small such that
ρ2 > 0 and choose ǫ3 >
1
2 . Then, for fixed ǫ1, ǫ3, choose
k1 >
2ǫ3
2ǫ3−1
(
h+ (h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+1)
2ǫ1
+
√
N
2 +
maxi∈N{li}
2
)
.
Then, for fixed k1, choose k4 >
√
N
2λmin(L⊗IN×N+A0) +
N maxi∈N{li}
2ǫ2λmin(L⊗IN×N+A0) +
k21 maxi∈N{li}
2λmin(L⊗IN×N+A0) . By the above
tuning rule, we get that ρ1 > 0, ρ2 > 0, ρ3 > 0.
Hence,
V˙2 ≤ −min{ρ1, ρ2, ρ3}
2
||E1||2, (50)
for ||E1|| ≥
√
k1ǫ3
min{ρ1,ρ2,ρ3} ||v˜||, where E1 = [(v +
P(x))T , (x − x∗)T , (z − 1N ⊗ x)T ]T . Hence, by Theorem
4.19 in [24], there exists a KL function β1 such that
||E1(t)|| ≤ β1(||E1(0)||, t) +
√
k1ǫ3
min{ρ1, ρ2, ρ3}
||v˜(t)||,
(51)
thus arriving at the conclusion.
We are now ready to provide the stability property of Nash
equilibrium under the proposed method in (42)-(43).
Theorem 3: Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 are satisfied.
Then, the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking is achieved
by utilizing (42)-(43) given that
k1 >
2ǫ3
2ǫ3 − 1
(
h+
(h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+ 1)
2ǫ1
+
√
N +maxi∈N{li}
2
)
k4 >
√
N
2λmin(L ⊗ IN×N +A0) +
N maxi∈N{li}
2ǫ2λmin(L ⊗ IN×N +A0)
+
k21 maxi∈N{li}
2λmin(L ⊗ IN×N +A0) ,
(52)
where ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3 are positive constants that satisfy
(h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+1)ǫ1
2 +
N maxi∈N{li}ǫ2
2 < m, and ǫ3 >
1
2 .
Proof: Based on Lemma 1, the proof can be completed
by following similar arguments as those in the proof of
Theorem 1.
This section provides a distributed counterpart for the
observer based approach. In the following, we adapt the
filter-based approach for distributed games.
B. A filter-based distributed Nash equilibrium seeking strat-
egy
Motivated by the filter-based strategy in (27)-(29) and the
distributed seeking strategy in [15]-[18], the control input of
player i for i ∈ N can be designed as
ui = −k1 ∂fi
∂xi
(zi)− k1yi, (53)
where k1 is a positive constant, zi = [zi1, zi2, · · · , ziN ]T and
yi =− xˆi + k2xi
z˙ij =− k3
(
N∑
k=1
aik(zij − zkj) + aij(zij − xj)
)
,
(54)
where k2, k3 are positive constants and xˆi is an auxiliary
variable generated by
˙ˆxi = −k2xˆi + k22xi. (55)
The following theorem establishes the stability of the Nash
equilibrium under the proposed method in (53)-(55).
Theorem 4: Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 are satisfied.
Then, the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking is achieved
by utilizing the proposed method in (53)-(55) provided that
the control gains are designed according to
k1 >
(h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+ 1)2
4m
+ h, k2 > k1,
k3 >
(2k1 maxi∈N{li}+
√
N +N maxi∈N{li})2
4min{λmin(A), k2 − k1}λmin(L ⊗ IN×N +A0) ,
(56)
where A =
[
m −h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+1
2
−h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+1
2 k1 − h
]
.
Proof: From (53)-(55), we can obtain that the concate-
nated vector form of the closed-loop system can be written
as
x˙ =v
v˙ =− k1P(z)− k1y
y˙ =− k2y + k2v
z˙ =− k3(L ⊗ IN×N +A0)(z − 1N ⊗ x),
(57)
where y = [y1, y2, · · · , yN ]T , and P(z) =[
∂f1
∂x1
(z1),
∂f2
∂x2
(z2), · · · , ∂fN∂xN (zN )
]T
.
Define y¯ = y − v, then, it can be obtained that
x˙ =v
v˙ =− k1P(z)− k1v − k1y¯
˙¯y =− k2y¯ − (−k1P(z)− k1v − k1y¯)
z˙ =− k3(L ⊗ IN×N +A0)(z − 1N ⊗ x).
(58)
To establish the stability property for (58), one can define
the Lyapunov candidate function as
V = V1 + V2 + V3 + V4, (59)
in which
V1 =
1
2
(v + P(x))T (v + P(x))
V2 =
1
2
(x− x∗)T (x− x∗), V3 = 1
2
y¯T y¯
V4 =
1
2
(z− 1N ⊗ x)T (z− 1N ⊗ x).
(60)
Then, following the analysis in the proof of Lemma 1 and
Theorem 2, we get that
V˙1 ≤− k1‖v + P(x)‖2 − k1(v + P(x))T y¯
+ k1 max
i∈N
{li}‖v+ P(x)‖‖z− 1N ⊗ x‖
+ h‖v + P(x)‖2
+ h
√
N max
i∈N
{li}‖v + P(x)‖‖x− x∗‖,
(61)
and
V˙2 ≤−m||x− x∗||2 + ||x− x∗||||v + P(x)||. (62)
Moreover,
V˙3 ≤− (k2 − k1)‖y¯‖2 + k1y¯T (v + P(x))
+ k1 max
i∈N
{li}‖y¯‖‖z− 1N ⊗ x‖. (63)
Furthermore,
V˙4 ≤− k3λmin(L ⊗ IN×N +A0)‖z− 1N ⊗ x‖2
+
√
N‖z− 1N ⊗ x‖‖v+ P(x)‖
+N max
i∈N
{li}‖‖z− 1N ⊗ x‖‖x− x∗‖.
(64)
Hence,
V˙ ≤− (k1 − h)‖v + P(x)‖2 −m||x− x∗||2 − (k2 − k1)‖y¯‖2
− k3λmin(L ⊗ IN×N +A0)‖z− 1N ⊗ x‖2
+ (k1 max
i∈N
{li}+
√
N)‖v + P(x)‖‖z− 1N ⊗ x‖
+ (h
√
N max
i∈N
{li}+ 1)‖v + P(x)‖‖x− x∗‖
+ k1 max
i∈N
{li}‖y¯‖‖z− 1N ⊗ x‖
+N max
i∈N
{li}‖z− 1N ⊗ x‖‖x− x∗‖.
(65)
DefineA =
[
m −h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+1
2
−h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+1
2 k1 − h
]
.
Then, A is symmetric positive definite by choosing
k1 >
(h
√
N maxi∈N{li}+1)2
4m + h. If this is the case,
V ≤− λmin(A)||E1||2 − (k2 − k1)‖y¯‖2
− k3λmin(L ⊗ IN×N +A0)‖z− 1N ⊗ x‖2
+ (k1 max
i∈N
{li}+
√
N)‖v + P(x)‖‖z− 1N ⊗ x‖
+ k1 max
i∈N
{li}‖y¯‖‖z− 1N ⊗ x‖
+N max
i∈N
{li}‖z− 1N ⊗ x‖‖x− x∗‖.
(66)
where E1 = [(x− x∗)T , (v + P(x))T ]T .
Choose k2 > k1, then,
V ≤−min{λmin(A), k2 − k1}||E2||2
− k3λmin(L ⊗ IN×N +A0)‖z− 1N ⊗ x‖2
+ (k1 max
i∈N
{li}+
√
N)‖v + P(x)‖‖z− 1N ⊗ x‖
+ k1 max
i∈N
{li}‖y¯‖‖z− 1N ⊗ x‖
+N max
i∈N
{li}‖z− 1N ⊗ x‖‖x− x∗‖.
(67)
where E2 = [E
T
1 , y¯
T ]T .
Hence, by choosing
k3 >
(2k1 maxi∈N{li}+
√
N +N maxi∈N{li})2
4min{λmin(A), k2 − k1}λmin(L ⊗ IN×N +A0) ,
(68)
we get that
V ≤− λmin(A1)||E3||2 (69)
where λmin(A1) > 0, E3 = [E
T
2 , z−(1N⊗x)T ]T and A1 =[
min{λmin(A), k2 − k1} χ
χ k3λmin(L ⊗ IN×N +A0)
]
,
where χ = − 2k1 maxi∈N{li}+
√
N+N maxi∈N{li}
2 .
Recalling the definition of the Lyapunov candidate func-
tion, the conclusion can be obtained.
Remark 7: Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking in this
paper is achieved based on the idea from [15]-[18] to
distributively obtain position estimates via leader-following
consensus algorithms. It is worth mentioning that in [15]-
[18], the players are considered as first-order integrators and
hence, the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy can be freely
designed. Different from [15]-[18], this paper considers that
the players are second-order integrators. With the players’
inherent dynamics involved, the Nash equilibrium seeking
algorithm should not only drive the players’ positions to
the Nash equilibrium but also steer their velocities to zero.
This indicates that stabilization of the players’ dynamics
and optimization of the players’ cost functions should be
achieved simultaneously. In particular, the stabilization of the
players’ dynamics usually requires the feedback of the play-
ers’ velocities, which are difficult to be accurately measured
in practice. Hence, this paper designs the distributed algo-
rithms without utilizing velocity measurement, which makes
the problem more complex. Note that the communication
graph is supposed to be fixed in this paper and switching
communication topologies (see e.g., [16][19]-[20]) will be
addressed in future works.
V. A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, the connectivity control game among
networked acceleration-actuated mobile sensors considered
in [1]-[2][18] is simulated. More specifically, we consider a
game with five players whose cost functions are given as
f1(x) = x
2
11 + x11 + 2x
2
12 + x12 + 1 + ‖x1 − x3‖2
f2(x) = 3x
2
21 + 2x21 + 3x
2
22 + 3x22 + 2 + ‖x2 − x3‖2
f3(x) = 5x
2
31 + 2x31 + 5x
2
32 + 2x32 + 3 + ‖x3 − x1‖2
f4(x) = 6x
2
41 + 4x41 + 6x
2
42 + 4x42 + 4 + ‖x4 − x2‖2
f5(x) = 8x
2
51 + 6x51 + 8x
2
52 + 6x52 + 5 + ‖x5 − x4‖2,
(70)
respectively.
The unique Nash equilibrium of the game is
[−0.363,−0.235,−0.307,−0.426,−0.227,−0.206,−0.329,
−0.347,−0.370,−0.372]T. In the following, we will
simulate the centralized algorithms and their distributed
counterparts, successively.
A. Centralized Nash equilibrium seeking
1) An observer-based Nash equilibrium seeking strat-
egy: This section provides numerical verifications for the
observer-based method in (5)-(6). In the numerical study, we
let x(0) = [−0.5, 0.5,−1, 0, 1, 0, 0,−1,−1,−1.5]T . More-
over, other variables in (5)-(6) are initialized to be zero.
The simulation results are given in Figs. 1-2, which plot
the players’ positions and their velocities, respectively. From
Figs. 1-2, we can see that the Nash equilibrium seeking is
achieved by the observer-based method in (5)-(6).
2) A filter-based Nash equilibrium seeking strategy:
This section illustrates the effectiveness of the filter-
based method in (27)-(29). In the simulation, we let
x(0) = [−0.5, 0.5,−1, 0, 1, 0, 0,−1,−1,−1.5]T . Further-
more, all the other variables in (27)-(29) are initialized at
zero. The simulation results generated by (27)-(29) are shown
in Figs. 3-4, which plot the players’ positions and velocities,
respectively. From the simulation results, we see that the
Nash equilibrium seeking can be achieved by utilizing the
filter-based method in (27)-(29).
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Fig. 1: The trajectories of players’ positions generated by
(5)-(6).
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Fig. 2: The players’ velocities generated by (5)-(6).
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Fig. 3: The trajectories of players’ positions generated by
(27)-(29).
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Fig. 4: The players’ velocities generated by (27)-(29).
4 5 1 2 3
Fig. 5: The communication graph for the players.
B. Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking
In this section, we provide simulation results for the
distributed Nash equilibrium seeking strategies. In the sim-
ulations , the communication topology is depicted in Fig. 5.
1) An observer-based approach for distributed Nash equi-
librium seeking: This section provides simulation results
for the method in (42)-(43). In the simulation, x(0) =
[−0.5, 0.5,−1, 0, 1, 0, 0,−1,−1,−1.5]T, and other variables
are initialized at zero. Generated by (42)-(43), the simulation
results are given in Figs. 6-7, which plot the players’ posi-
tions and velocities, respectively. From the figures, it can
be seen that the Nash equilibrium seeking can be achieved
by utilizing the observer-based method in (42)-(43) in a
distributed fashion.
2) A filter-based approach for distributed Nash equilib-
rium seeking: This section provides numerical verification
for the distributed method in (53)-(54). In the numerical
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Fig. 6: The trajectories of players’ positions generated by
(42)-(43).
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Fig. 7: The players’ velocities generated by (42)-(43).
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Fig. 8: The trajectories of players’ positions generated by
(53)-(54).
study, x(0) = [−0.5, 0.5,−1, 0, 1, 0, 0,−1,−1,−1.5]T and
the initial values of other variables in (53)-(54) are set to
be zero. The simulation results generated by (53)-(54) are
shown in Figs. 8-9, which illustrate the players’ positions
and velocities, respectively. From the figures, it is clear that
the Nash equilibrium seeking is achieved in a distributed
fashion by utilizing the method in (53)-(54).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper develops two Nash equilibrium strategies for
games in which the players’ actions are governed by second-
order integrator-type dynamics. In particular, the players’
velocities are supposed to be unavailable for feedback con-
trol of the players’ positions. Without utilizing velocity
measurement, an observer-based approach and a filter-based
approach are designed. Through Lyapunov stability analysis,
it is theoretically shown that the players’ positions and
velocities would be steered to the Nash equilibrium and zero,
respectively. Extensions to games in distributed networks are
discussed. The presented results show that both the observer-
based approach and the filter-based approach can be adapted
to solve distributed games, thus showing their extensibility. It
would be interesting future works to extend the current work
to the recently formulated N -cluster games (see [21]-[23])
and non-model-based counterparts (see e.g., [25]).
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Fig. 9: The players’ velocities generated by (53)-(54).
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